My name is Thomas William Strickland Hodgson. ‘Hodgson’ is written ‘霍奇森’ in Chinese.
I am a philosopher working on philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. I mostly write about propositions.
Hodgson, T. (2025). A defence of structured propositions.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12481
Hodgson, T. (2025). Russellians should have a no proposition view of empty names.
Inquiry,
68(2), 826–853.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2075916
Hodgson, T. (2025). The act-type theory of propositions as a theory of what is said.
Analytic Philosophy,
66(1), 37–62.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12309
Hodgson, T. (2023). The act-type theory of propositions as a theory of cognitive distinctness.
Studia Semiotyczne,
37(2), 57–79.
https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvii2.04
Hodgson, T. (2022). Propositions as interpreted
abstracta. In A. R. Murray & C. Tillman (Eds.),
The Routledge handbook of propositions (pp. 256–267). Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315270500-18
Hodgson, T. (2021). Act-type theories of propositions.
Philosophy Compass,
16(11).
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12788
Hodgson, T. (2021). Grammar constrains acts of predication.
Inquiry.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990793
Hodgson, T. (2021). Neutral predication.
Erkenntnis,
86, 1381–1389.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00159-6
Hodgson, T. (2021). Teaching & learning guide for: Act-type theories of propositions.
Philosophy Compass,
16(12).
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12795
Hodgson, T. (2020). Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics [Review of
Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics, by S. Predelli].
Analysis,
80(4), 834–836.
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa062
Hodgson, T. (2020). Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions.
Synthese,
197, 5411–5433.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01971-3
Hodgson, T. (2020). The structure of content is not transparent.
Topoi,
39, 425–437.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9520-6
Hodgson, T. (2018). Meaning underdetermines what is said, therefore utterances express many propositions.
Dialectica,
72(2), 165–189.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12221
Hodgson, T. (2018). Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names.
Inquiry,
61(7), 670–691.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1372307
Hodgson, T. (2016). Propositions [Review of
Propositions, by T. Merricks].
International Journal of Philosophical Studies,
24(4), 585–587.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2016.1219523
Hodgson, T. (2014). New Thinking about Propositions [Review of
New Thinking about Propositions, by J. C. King, S. Soames, & J. Speaks].
Polish Journal of Philosophy,
8(2), 80–83.
https://doi.org/10.5840/pjphil20148214
Hodgson, T. (2013).
Propositions: an essay on linguistic content [PhD, University of St Andrews].
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3677
Hodgson, T. (2013). Why we should not identify sentence structure with propositional structure.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
43(5-6), 612–633.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.871111
Hodgson, T. (2012). Propositions, structure and representation.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
112(3), 339–349.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00339.x
Hodgson, T. (2012). Structured propositions and shared content. In P. Stalmaszczyk (Ed.),
Philosophical and formal approaches to linguistic analysis (pp. 177–195). Ontos Verlag.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110320244.177
Hodgson, T. (2012). Underdeterminacy and attitude-reports. Philosophical Writings, 77–85.
Hodgson, T. (2011). Underdeterminacy and attitude-reports. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics, 23, 21–46.
Here are the materials for two courses that I taught at Shanxi University in 2024: