My name is Thomas William Strickland Hodgson. ‘Hodgson’ is written ‘霍奇森’ in Chinese.
I am a philosopher working on philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. I mostly write about propositions.
I am an Adiunkt/Assistant Professor in the Institute of Philosophy, University of Gdańsk and a Specially Appointed Research Professor in the School of Philosophy, Shanxi University.
I did my PhD at the University of St Andrews where I was a member of Arché. I then worked at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, University College Dublin, Queen’s University Belfast, and King’s College London.
I am a member of the Dialectica Open Access Initiative.
You can email me at hello@twshodgson.net.
You can get in touch with me on Mastodon.
I don’t have much code to share, but what I do is on Codeberg.
My ORCID iD is 0000-0001-5776-8887.
I am on PhilPeople.
You can subscribe to an RSS feed about my work.
Hodgson, T. (2023). The act-type theory of propositions as a theory of cognitive distinctness. Studia Semiotyczne, 37(2), 57–79. https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvii2.04
Hodgson, T. (2023). The act-type theory of propositions as a theory of what is said. Analytic Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12309
Hodgson, T. (2022). Russellians should have a no proposition view of empty names. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2075916
Hodgson, T. (2021). Grammar constrains acts of predication. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990793
Hodgson, T. (2021). Neutral predication. Erkenntnis, 86, 1381–1389. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00159-6
Hodgson, T. (2021). Act-type theories of propositions. Philosophy Compass, 16(11). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12788
Hodgson, T. (2021). Teaching & learning guide for: Act-type theories of propositions. Philosophy Compass, 16(12). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12795
Hodgson, T. (2020). Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions. Synthese, 197, 5411–5433. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01971-3
Hodgson, T. (2020). The structure of content is not transparent. Topoi, 39, 425–437. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9520-6
Hodgson, T. (2018). Meaning underdetermines what is said, therefore utterances express many propositions. Dialectica, 72(2), 165–189. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12221
Hodgson, T. (2018). Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. Inquiry, 61(7), 670–691. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1372307
Hodgson, T. (2013). Why we should not identify sentence structure with propositional structure. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(5-6), 612–633. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.871111
Hodgson, T. (2012). Propositions, structure and representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112(3), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00339.x
Hodgson, T. (2022). Propositions as interpreted abstracta. In A. R. Murray & C. Tillman (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of propositions (pp. 256–267). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315270500-18
Hodgson, T. (2012). Structured propositions and shared content. In P. Stalmaszczyk (Ed.), Philosophical and formal approaches to linguistic analysis (pp. 177–195). Ontos Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110320244.177
Hodgson, T. (2012). Underdeterminacy and attitude-reports. Philosophical Writings, 77–85.
Hodgson, T. (2011). Underdeterminacy and attitude-reports. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics, 23, 21–46.
Hodgson, T. (2020). Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics [Review of Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics, by S. Predelli]. Analysis, 80(4), 834–836. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa062
Hodgson, T. (2016). Propositions [Review of Propositions, by T. Merricks]. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24(4), 585–587. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2016.1219523
Hodgson, T. (2014). New Thinking about Propositions [Review of New Thinking about Propositions, by J. C. King, S. Soames, & J. Speaks]. Polish Journal of Philosophy, 8(2), 80–83. https://doi.org/10.5840/pjphil20148214
Hodgson, T. (2013). Propositions: an essay on linguistic content [PhD, University of St Andrews]. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3677
Here is the syllabus and the slides for my course Philosophy of Language at King’s College London: