About
Thomas Hodgson is a philosopher who works on philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind.
‘Hodgson’ is written in Chinese as: 霍奇森.
Thomas Hodgson is a Specially Appointed Research Professor at the School of Philosophy and Sociology at Shanxi University.
Thomas Hodgson was a Teaching Fellow at the Department of Philosophy at King's College London, a University Tutor at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen's University Belfast, a Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Philosophy at University College Dublin funded by the Irish Research Council, and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
Thomas Hodgson got his PhD in Philosophy from the University of St Andrews. He was a member of the Arché research centre as part of the Arts and Humanities Research Council funded project Contextualism and Relativism. His thesis is titled Propositions: An Essay on Linguistic Content. His supervisors were Herman Cappelen and François Recanati.
Thomas Hodgson edits the Propositions category on PhilPapers.
Contact
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5776-8887Links
Philosophy
Software
Publications
Journal articles
Hodgson, T. (forthcoming). Russellians should have a no proposition view of empty names. Inquiry. This is a companion to my ‘Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names’.
Hodgson, T. (2021). Grammar constrains acts of predication. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990793
Hodgson, T. (2021). Neutral predication. Erkenntnis, 86, 1381–1389. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00159-6
Hodgson, T. (2021). Act-type theories of propositions. Philosophy Compass, 16(11). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12788
Hodgson, T. (2021). Teaching & learning guide for: Act-type theories of propositions. Philosophy Compass, 16(12). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12795
Hodgson, T. (2020). Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions. Synthese, 197, 5411–5433. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01971-3
Hodgson, T. (2020). The structure of content is not transparent. Topoi, 39, 425–437. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9520-6
Hodgson, T. (2018). Meaning underdetermines what is said, therefore utterances express many propositions. Dialectica, 72(2), 165–189. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12221
Hodgson, T. (2018). Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. Inquiry, 61(7), 670–691. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1372307
Hodgson, T. (2013). Why we should not identify sentence structure with propositional structure. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(5–6), 612–633. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.871111
Hodgson, T. (2012). Propositions, structure and representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112(3), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00339.x
Book chapters
Hodgson, T. (forthcoming). Propositions as interpreted abstracta. In A. Murray & C. Tillman (Eds.), Routledge handbook of propositions. Routledge.
Working papers and proceedings
Hodgson, T. (2012). Structured propositions and shared content. In P. Stalmaszczyk (Ed.), Philosophical and formal approaches to linguistic analysis (pp. 177–195). Ontos Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110320244.177 (proceedings of PhiLang 2011)
Hodgson, T. (2012). Underdeterminacy and attitude-reports. Philosophical Writings, 77–85. (proceedings of the 2011 BPPA Graduate Conference)
Hodgson, T. (2011). Underdeterminacy and attitude-reports. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics, 23, 21–46.
Book reviews
Hodgson, T. (2021). Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics [Review of Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics, by S. Predelli]. Analysis, 80(4), 834–836. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa062 Free access
Hodgson, T. (2016). Propositions [Review of Propositions, by T. Merricks]. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24(4), 585–587. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2016.1219523
Hodgson, T. (2014). New Thinking about Propositions [Review of New Thinking about Propositions, by J. C. King, S. Soames, & J. Speaks]. Polish Journal of Philosophy, 8(2), 80–83. https://doi.org/10.5840/pjphil20148214
Thesis
Hodgson, T. (2013). Propositions: an essay on linguistic content [PhD, University of St Andrews]. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3677
Ben Caplan and Chris Tillman's ‘Benacerraf's Revenge’ cites a manuscript titled ‘What Propositions Are’ which became chapter one of my thesis.
Talks
- ‘Independence of Belief’; Warsaw, Poland; 3rd Context, Cognition and Communication Conference: Varieties of Meaning and Content; 19–21 September 2022
- ‘Propositions as Acts of Saying’; Online; Philosophy of Language Group, University of Vienna; 10 December 2021
- ‘Propositions as Acts of Saying’; Online; Tokyo Forum for Analytic Philosophy; 12 May 2021
- ‘Russellian Act-type Theories of Propositions’; Online; Sign–Language–Reality seminar colloquium, University of Warsaw; 30 October 2020
- ‘Grammar Constrains Acts of Predication’; Donostia/San Sebastián, Spain; The Act-Type Theory of Propositions Workshop, University of the Basque Country; 11 December 2019
- ‘Neutral Predication’; Bratislava, Slovakia; Propositions, Reference and Meaning; 29 November 2019
- ‘Sentences Have Propositional Contents’; Taiyuan, China; Shanxi University; 11 June 2019
- ‘A Defence of Structured Propositions’; Taiyuan, China; Shanxi University; 10 June 2019
- ‘A Defence of Structured Propositions’; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Issues in Contemporary Semantics and Ontology V: Perspectives on Content; 29 May 2019
- ‘A Defence of Structured Propositions’; Oxford, UK; Linguistic Meaning: Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics; 25 April 2019
- ‘Meaning Underdetermines What Is Said, Therefore Utterances Express Many Propositions’; London, UK; Pragmatics Reading Group, University College London Linguistics; 28 November 2018
- ‘A Defence of Structured Propositions’; Skálholt, Iceland; The Iceland Meaning Workshop; 17 August 2018
- ‘A Defence of Structured Propositions’; Warsaw, Poland; 2nd Context, Cognition and Communication Conference: Contexts, Concepts, Objects; 17 June 2018
- ‘Subject Matter and Structured Propositions’; Dublin, Ireland; University College Dublin Workshop with Stephen Yablo; 21 May 2018
- ‘A Defence of Structured Propositions’; Birmingham, UK; Relations, Unity, and Regress Workshop; 26 March 2018
- ‘How to Decide Between Russellian Solutions to the Problem of Empty Names’; Dublin, Ireland; Dublin Philosophy Research Network; 18 July 2017
- ‘New Work for a Theory of Content’; Edinburgh, UK; Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association; 16 July 2017
- ‘New Work for a Theory of Content’; Reykjavík, Iceland; University of Iceland; 21 April 2017
- ‘Linguistic Meaning, Semantic Content, and Testimony’; Dublin, Ireland; Workshop on the Work of Elizabeth Fricker, University College Dublin; 31 March 2017
- ‘New Work for a Theory of Content’; Belfast, UK; Cross Ireland Studies in Analytic Philosophy; 22 March 2017
- ‘Meaningfulness Without Propositions’; Cork, Ireland; University College Cork; 25 August 2016
- ‘The Alleged Transparency of Propositional Structure’; Cardiff, UK; Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association; 10 July 2016
- ‘Meaningfulness Without Propositions’; Warsaw, Poland; Proper Names in Fiction; 20 June 2016
- ‘The Alleged Transparency of Propositional Structure’; Warsaw, Poland; 1st Context, Cognition and Communication Conference: Context Dependence in Language, Action and Cognition; 15 June 2016
- ‘Variation of Propositional Structure’; Dublin, Ireland; Dublin Philosophy Research Network; 23 May 2016
- ‘The Alleged Transparency of Propositional Structure’; Glasgow, UK; Early Career Mind Network Forum; 6 May 2016
- ‘Emptiness and Meaningfulness’; Cambridge, UK; Semantics and Philosophy in Europe 8; 18 September 2015
- ‘Emptiness and Meaningfulness’; Oslo, Norway; Third Conference of the PLM (Philosophy of Language and Mind network); 12 September 2015
- ‘The Existence of Propositions and Our Access to Them’; St. Petersburg, Russia; Semantics and Philosophy in Europe 6; 11 June 2013
- ‘Propositions Need Not Be Intrinsically Representational’; BPPA podcast symposium; 12 April 2012
- ‘What Propositions Are’; Oslo, Norway; Propositions Workshop, CSMN; 3 April 2012
- ‘Underdeterminacy and Attitude-Reports’; Reading, UK; BPPA Graduate Conference; 24 September 2011
- ‘Propositions, Structure, and Representation’; Brighton, UK; Graduate Session, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association; 9 July 2011
- ‘Underdeterminacy and Attitude-Reports’; Cerisy Château, France; Meaning, Context and Implicit Content; 6 June 2011
- ‘Structured Propositions and Shared Content’; Łódź, Poland; PhiLang 2011; 13 May 2011
- ‘Propositions, Structure, and Representation’; Ardtornish, UK; Propositions and the Aim of Semantics; 18 May 2011
- ‘On Speech Act Pluralism’; Cambridge, UK; Contextualism vs. Minimalism Workshop, Department of Linguistics, University of Cambridge; 17 May 2010
Teaching
Thomas Hodgson has taught logic, ethics and metaethics, philosophy of language, history of analytic philosophy, programming to cognitive science students, and philosophy of medicine to medical students at the University of St Andrews, University College Dublin, Queen's University Belfast, and King's College London.
Thomas Hodgson was module coordinator for the undergraduate module Philosophy of Communication at University College Dublin: syllabus.
Thomas Hodgson was module coordinator for the undergraduate and MA module Philosophy of Language at King's College London.