I am a philosopher working on philosophy of language, philosophy of
mind, and metaphysics. I often write about propositions.
Hodgson, T. (forthcoming). The Metaphysics of Propositions [Review of
The Metaphysics of Propositions, by M. Davidson].
The
Philosophical Quarterly.
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqag074
Hodgson, T. (2026). Independence of belief.
Erkenntnis.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-026-01076-1
Hodgson, T. (2025). A defence of structured propositions.
Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly,
106(2), 119–130.
https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12481
Hodgson, T. (2025). Russellians should have a no proposition view of
empty names.
Inquiry,
68(2), 826–853.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2075916
Hodgson, T. (2025). The act-type theory of propositions as a theory of
what is said.
Analytic Philosophy,
66(1), 37–62.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12309
Hodgson, T. (2023). The act-type theory of propositions as a theory of
cognitive distinctness.
Semiotic Studies,
37(2).
https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvii2.04
Hodgson, T. (2022). Propositions as interpreted abstracta. In C. Tillman
& A. Murray (Eds.),
The Routledge handbook of propositions
(pp. 256–267). Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315270500-18
Hodgson, T. (2021). Act-type theories of propositions.
Philosophy
Compass,
16(11), e12788.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12788
Hodgson, T. (2021). Grammar constrains acts of predication.
Inquiry,
0(0), 1–21.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990793
Hodgson, T. (2021). Neutral predication.
Erkenntnis,
86(6), 1381–1389.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00159-6
Hodgson, T. (2021). Teaching & learning guide for: act-type theories
of propositions.
Philosophy Compass,
16(12), e12795.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12795
Hodgson, T. (2020). Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist
Semantics [Review of
Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist
Semantics, by S. Predelli].
Analysis,
80(4),
834–836.
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa062
Hodgson, T. (2020). Russellians can solve the problem of empty names
with nonsingular propositions.
Synthese,
197(12),
5411–5433.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01971-3
Hodgson, T. (2020). The structure of content is not transparent.
Topoi,
39(2), 425–437.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9520-6
Hodgson, T. (2018). Meaning underdetermines what is said, therefore
utterances express many propositions.
Dialectica,
72(2), 165–190.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12221
Hodgson, T. (2018). Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty
names.
Inquiry,
61(7), 670–691.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1372307
Hodgson, T. (2016). Propositions [Review of
Propositions, by T.
Merricks].
International Journal of Philosophical Studies,
24(4), 585–587.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2016.1219523
Hodgson, T. (2014). New Thinking about Propositions [Review of
New
Thinking about Propositions, by J. C. King, J. Speaks, & S.
Soames].
Polish Journal of Philosophy,
8(2), 80–83.
https://doi.org/10.5840/pjphil20148214
Hodgson, T. (2013). Structured propositions and shared content. In P.
Stalmaszczyk (Ed.),
Philosophical and formal approaches to
linguistic analysis (pp. 177–196). De Gruyter.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110320244.177
Hodgson, T. (2013). Why we should not identify sentence structure with
propositional structure.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
43(5–6), 612–633.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.871111
Hodgson, T. W. S. (2013).
Propositions: an essay on linguistic
content [Thesis, University of St Andrews].
https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/3677
Hodgson, T. (2012). Propositions, structure and representation.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
112(3),
339–349.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00339.x
Hodgson, T. (2011). Underdeterminacy & attitude-reports. In Y. Tian
(Ed.),
UCL working papers in linguistics (pp. 21–46).
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/brain-sciences/contents-uclwpl-23-2011